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INTRODUCTION

0----__
Trust estates and trust funds have ever been carefully gaurded and protected, both at law and equity.

The

law lays down the most stringent and arbitrary rules for
the guidance of those, who are entrusted with the management

uf such property.

pointed out by the trust

The path of duty, when not
instrument itself, is carefully

mapped out by the law and he who assumes to discharge a
trust duty must keep within the narrow path laid out.
He steps without, uhdei, an., circumstances, only at his
peril.
The general theory of following trust funds seems to
be:- That whenever the trust fund has been converted into another species of property, that if its

identity can

be traced it will be held in its new form liable to the
righta of the cestui que trust;

or as the product of it,

equity will follow it, unless the greater equity of a
bona fide
vene.

-

holderfottgalue without notice, should inter-

Thus through all the changes the trust may under-

go if the article substituted can be identified as such
substitute it will be impressed with the trust.

The

right

of following it

tification is lost.

only fails,

into

of iden-

And this, according to the views

of those who follcw what
the general rule,

when the power

is~known, in this country, as

is the case when the subject is

turned

money andmixed and confounded in a mass of property

of the same kind.

TPUSt

MONEY INVESTED WITH THAT OF THE TRUSTEE.

Where

it can be showm that

the trust

fund has gone b

to swell another fund, or has been used in the purchaee
of property, thougL

the part purchased with trust funds,

arid the part not so purchasea are entirely mixed, what
in such a case are the rights of a zestui que trust?
le relegated

Is

to the rights of a simple creditor, or, if

not what are his rights?
This question asually arises when a trustee, after
having used the trust funds contrary to his duty, becomes
insolvent and the cestui que trust endeavors

to enforce

a claim to priority against the general creditors.

If

the trust fund were traceable to a separate piece of
property therecould be no question, and there would oe
none, and still it is contrary to all sense

of justice

and equity, if because the trustee has mingled the trust
money with his own, the cestui que trust shall lose all
rights against the property purchased with hi3 maoney.
Such a rule could only be defended on the supposition
that when the trust

fund is

mi,-id

with otter money it

is

beyond the power of equity to grant the relief, which is
granted when the trust fund is not so confused.
Th1is
(a)
does not now appear to be the rule,
although years ago

(b)
such was considered to be the rule.
fund is

Where the trust

traceable into a certain investment, and the part

it bears to the whole sum so invested is capable of bein.proven, the cestui que trust should be allowed to treat
the

investments aa imade for his benefit in the sane way

that he could if all the money so invested had been his.
That

is to say, thtat he should be entitled to such a pro-

portion of the whole as his trust money so invested, bore
(c)
to the whole sum so investea.
The fundamental reason in one case as

in the other

being that a trustee should het and cannot be allowed to
make a profit out of a wrongful act.

(a)
(b)
(c)

If the property

Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 C11. Div. 696.
Whitcomb v. JacGbs, 1 Salk. 160.
Taylor v. Plumraer, 3 Maule &e S. 562.

which he wrongfully purchased were held to be subject
otly to a lien for the amount invested an# increase in
value would go to a wrong doer.
It will often happen, nevertheless, that the cestui
que trust cannot identify any property as being purchased
wholly

or in any definite proportion with his money,

and therefore

equity cannot regard him as the

owner of

any property either individually or in common, and yet
he

can show that the trust fund has gone to swell the

general

assets of the trustee's estate, as where

money has been usea in a business which afterwards

the
be-

comes bankrmpt.

Here strictly speak ing there can hard-

ly be a trust, as

it is as necessary for equitable as

for legal ownership that there should be fixed property
as the subject matter of it.

In both cases

the necessity

rests rather on the nature of things than on any rule
law.

It would

,

however, be in the highest degree un-

just that the rights
made to depend

of

of the cestui q-e trust should be

on whether his property is distinguisha-

ble from the general mass of the trustee's property, or
indistinguishable.
trustee's
if

,

Though noplesslyconfused with the

still his money or-

aproceeds

equity c an by any means work it

out he

is

there,

and

should be en-

5

abled to get at it,

Equity accomplishes justice in such

a case by giving the cestui que trust a lien upon the
propertyr,- a right to be paid from the estate in priority to the general creditors.

This latter right the ces-

tui que trust always has though he also iray be able to
(a)
follow his money into a certain investment/ In case the
investment has turned out badly, it would be

for his ad-

vantage not to regard the investment as being

maae for

him, but assume that it had

been wrongfully converted,

and take alien on what was purchased with his money and
co me in with the general creditors for any deficiency

(b)
ocasioned by the depreciation of the investment.
If a trustee purchase real estate partly with his *&
own property and partly with trust funds, it is universal
ly allowed that the cestui que trust has a claim in equity against the land, but the exact nature of the right
allowed is not uniformly agreed upon.

If the property

purchased should increase in value, it id for his

inter-

est to obtain an undivided share of it rather than a lien

------------------------------------------------------Cook v. Tullis,
(a) Monroe v. Collin, 95 Mo. o3;
Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 476.
18 Wall. 332;
(b) Riehl v. The Foundry, 104 Ind. 70.

on the property for the bare amount of the

trust money

If the proportion which the trust money bore

invested.

to the purchase money is known or acertainable, the larger right should

it seems be allowed, as the trustee's eaFte

tate otherwise benefits by the misappropriation.

question has not however, been very fully discussed and
the decisions do not appear to be uniform.

in England

the point san 4ardly be considered settled, but
bull v. Hallett, Jessell

,

M. R.,

in Knatch

after speaking of the

cestui que trust's right to elect either to take the
property purchased, or to hold it as a security for the
amount

of the trust money laid

out in the purchase, says:

"But in the second case, where a trustee has mixed the ;m
money with his own there is this distinction, t-at the
cestui que trust,
lect to take

or beneficial owner, can no longer e-

the property,

because it is no longer

bought with the trust money purely, and
a mixed fund.

He

simply, but with

is, however, still entitlea to a

charge on the property pnrchased for the amount of the
trust money laid out in the purchase."
The

general rtle

in

this

country allows the cestui

que trust to recover a specific share of tle property
purchased with any portion of such trust funas.(a)
(a) Perry on Trusts. Sec. 427; Jones v. Dexter, 13C
Mass. 380; Schlaefer v. ('orson, 52 Barb. 510.

WITH TH]OSE OF THE

TRUST FUNDS MINGLE)

TRUSTEE IN THE SAME BANK ACCOUNT.
0 ----------------

A question similar to that which has been considered,

arises where trust money is paid into a 6ank to the
of the trustee, funas of h-is own being

private account
paid

to the same account.

Here the question is not

W"1tlher the cestui que trust is entitled to a lien o- a
proportionate part, for it is entirely immaterial
case

of money,

but whether he ns

gainst the bank account.

any rights

in the

at all

a-

Tlhere can be little doubt,

that, according to the older English precedents, tn e
ljon-

question would have to be answered in the negative.
ey,

when mixed with other money,

coula not be followed

(a)
because it had no "ear marks".
A consideration of these old cases led Justice Fry,
as Akte as 1879,

to decide that the rights

of the cestui

(b)
que trust were lost.

In

deciding as he did in this

case Justice Fry took occasion to say that equity and
justice was against

the rule;

but that nevertheless

considered the rule well settlea.

(a)
(b)

he

Thus the law remain-

Whitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160.
Ex parte Dale, l1 CH. Div. 772.

ed until Sir George Jessell, i. P.,
of Knatchbull v. hallett,

in the famous cese

after thoroughly reviewing

all the authorities frankly acknowledged that such was
formerly the law, but
equity had

advanced.

t:hat

he was of the opinion that

He therefore over-ruled Justice

Fry, and as the law now stands moneymaybe followed in
the same manner as any other chatels Along as it can be
traced into a specific fund.

Thus we escape the con-

sequence of a trustee mingling a small sum of his own,
with the trust funds, and thereby making of -iimself a
debtor instead of a trustee, when in truth the trust fund
is still in existence and in his charge.
In Knatchbull v. Iallett, Jessell, M. R.,

says:-

"Supposing, instead of being invested in thae purchasa of
land or goods, the monies were simply mixed with other
monies

of the trustee, using the term again in its full

sense as including every person in a fiduciary relation,
aoes it mage any difference according to the modern doctrine of equity?

1 say none.

able if it were to d.o:so.
was

It would be very

-emark-

Supposing the trust money

1000 sovereigns andthe trustee put them in a bag,

andby ,,iistai~e, 'acciaent or ctherwise,
eign of his own into the bag, could

aropped a sover.

anybody suppose that

a judge

in equity would find any difficultr in sayin'g

tn-

t.Lat

cestui que trust

to take a tious-

has a rigt

anla sovereigns out of that bag?

I do not like to c :;ll

it a charge of 1000 sovereigns on the 1001 sovereigns,
1 ive

but ti-.at is the effect of it.
It

no doubt of it.

would make no difference if, instead of one sovereign

it was anotiier 1000 sovereigns;

but instead of putting it

into his bag, or, after putting it into his bag, he carries the bag to nis bankers,
law,

the bankerh are

but if

what then?

According to

his debtors for t

total amount;

you lend the trust money to a third person,

can follow it.

you

If in the case pupposed the trustee had

lent "he 1000 sovereigns to a man without security, you
could follow tne debt and t.'ke it from the debtor.

if

he lent it on a promissory note, you could take the promissory note; or the bond, if it

were a bond.

stead of lending the wkiole amount in
Lad addea a sovereign, or

if, in-

one sum simply,

h-e

nad added 5000 sovereigns of

his own to the 1000 sovereigns,

the only difference is

this;

ti~at instead of taking the bond or the promissory

note,

the cestui que trust would

Lave a charge for the

amountlof trhe trust money on the bond or promissory note.
So it would be on the simple contract debt; that is,

if

the debt we

*e

of such a nature as

itor and thedebtor,

between the cr d-

you could not sever the debt

so as to show what part -:ras trust
que

th"at,

money,

trust would have a right to a

in two

then the cestui

charge on th:

whole."

RULE ThEL THE T USTEE 11AS DRA7T N AGAI.TST
THE ACCOUNT

In

most of the

cases w.;ich arise

on this

point

there

is a difficulty encountered not heretofore referred to;
that

is the trustee after mingling his own and the trust

money in the private bank account draws

on the account

to a greater or less extent. Can the aestui que trust
still claim to be reimbursed in full from the amount
left on deposit,
tion

or s ,ould it rather

be held that a por-

of themoney withdrawn was his?
It is a general presumption of law, whenit becomes

important to decide,

to which of several deposits,

drafts

drawn on the gener l account should be charged, that the
deposits

shAll be deemed to have bepn drawn out in the

order in which they were

put in, so that each draft wv.en

paid would be charged against tne earliest deposit in the
account.
(a)

(e)
Clavton's

Case, 1 Mer. 572.

f:.is

is a general rule appliea in all ,ercc.ntile

transactions;

and was followed in Pennell v. Deffell, 4

DeJ. M. & G. 372, wich was a case
30 deposite. and drriwn against as

lher- trust funds wet'to indivate tat a por-

tion of tr.> trust fund i, d been used.
proved, and followed

T Ais rule was ap-

b-, a number of later English aecis-

ions

; but in the celebratea case of Knatchbull v. Hall-

ett,

tLe court aft,:r faving disposed of the view that

cestui que trust had

the

no claim at all, decided th-at the

presumption did not arise,

when the account is composed

in part of trust funds and in part of the trustee's private funds,

out that in such a case it should be presum-

ed that the trustee drew out what
draw out,

to wit,

1

is own money.

he had a right to
In deciding this lat-

ter point, Sir George Jessell, M. 7.,

said:-

"Now upon

principle, nothing can be better settled, either in our
law, or I suppose, the law of all civilized countries,
than this,

thaat where a man does an act which fay right-

fully be performed,

lie cannot say that the act was

tentiofally and in fact done wrongly.

in-

A man who has a

right of entry can not say he comnitted a trespas3 in entering.

A man who sells the goods of another as agent

for the owner can not prevent the owner adopting the

sale, and deny that he acted for the owner,

It runs

throughout our law, ana we are familiar with numerous instances in tLe law of real property.

A man wh1o grants

a lease, believing he has sufficient estate to grant it,
although it turns out that he ha3 not,
whicl

but Las a power

enables Lim to grant it, h.e is not

ti.at he did not grant it under the power.

allowed to ia:r
Whenever it

can be doae rightfully, he is not allowed to say, against
a person entitled to the property or the right, t-at Le
has done it wrongfully.

That is th.e universel law."

This tior oughly sound, just, and equitable doctrine
has with but few exceptions, notably the courts of Maine
(a)
and Pennsylvania, been the rule of the American courts.

(a)

Knatchbull v. lallett, L. R. 13 CH. Div. 696.
National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54.
VanAlen v. Th-e Bank,
52 IT. Y. 11.
Overseers v. .ank of Virginia, 2 Gratt. 544.
United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30.
Hooley v. Gieve, 9 Abb. N. C. 8 Aff 82 N.Y.5,3L.
Baker v. Bank, 100 N.Y. 61.

WHEN TH.E TRUST FUND HAS BEEN
WI T1iDRAWVLq

If in such a case as we nave be n considering the
balance in the bank to the creait of the trustee should
fall

below the amount

of the trust

fund;

the conclusion

that as to the difference between the two, the trust money has been
Thus as

drawn out is

inevitable and must be aaopted.

to the difference the cestui que

trust must

take

up the scent and endeavor to trace t-is difference into
its present lodgment and there force cis claim against i
Failing to successfully trace and identify the specific
fund or its proceeds, ±ie must content himeelf with the
(a)
Nor, following the
position of an ordinary creditor.
reasoning of the above cases, will subsequent deposits
of the trustee's

own money give any larger rights,

absence of special sircumstances showing a purpose

in tl:e
on

the part of the trustee to make up the deficiency in the
trust fund, and such a purpose will not be presumed as against general creaitors of the trustee.

TLerefore, un-

less it be proven that the subsequent deposits were made

(a)

Tex. 489;
v. Weems,69
Continental Ban
Cavin v. Gleasman, 105 N. Y. 254.
Philadelph ia Bank v. Dowd, 2L. R. Ann. 430.
Neele-Y v. Pood, 54 Mich. 134.

for the purpose of restoring the trust fund, the equitable charge of the cestui que trust cannot exceed the
smallest balance to the trustee's credit, since the deposit of the trust funds.

Therefore, if the balance

shpuld be wiped out, but for a day, the cestui que trust
(a)
would be relegatea to the position of a simple creditor.

TRUST MONEY A PART OF THE TRUSTEE'S ESTATE.

It is not necessary to trace the trust fund into
some specific property in order to enforce the
it can be traced into the

trust;

if

estate of the ag-nt or trustee

(b)
it

is sufficient.

Thus, wher-

a bank receives money as

agent whichit mixes with its own funas, tr.e principAl,
on the failure of the bank, is not required to show into
what particular assett

of the bank this money went, but

need only show that it went into such assetts
form,
all

tchus

increasing themin that amount.

fours with; this

statement

is

found in

in some

A case upon
People v.

Bank

(a)
Cavin v. Gleason, 105 IN. Y. 254; Con. Bk. v.
Weems, 69 Tex. 489.
(b)McLeod v. Evans, 28 N. W. 173; People v. Bank of
Rochester, 96 ii. Y. 32.

(a)
of Rochester.

notes for the firm of S.

tain

it,

The defendant bank having discounted cerH.

& F.

, a depositor with

and that firm, wishing to anticipate jayment,

gave

to the bank its checks for the amount of the notes less
rebate of interest; which checks the bank received and
charged in the firm account,

and entries were made in the

bank books to the effect that the notes were paid.

The

firm at the time supposed that the bank held the notes,
but they had in fact previously sold by it.
notes came due the bank failed.

Before the

Held, that an order re-

quiting the receiver to I-ay the notes out of the fiinds in
his hands was properly granted; that the transaction between the bank and said firm was not in their relation
of debtor and creditor, not in that of bank and depositor
but by it a trust was created, the violation of which
constitues a fraud by which the bank could not profit,
and to the benefit of which the receiver was not entitled.

This case has been warmly approved of in many of

(a)

People v.

Bank of Rochester,

96 N. Y. 32.

our sister

states.

facts almost

Several

cases in

Kansas

identicil with those involved in

involving

this case,

(a)
have been decided in

the :3ame way.

The decided weight oif authorityT
by these cases.

is,

I think,

shown

True there are some cases to the con-

trary, but they are now in the minority.

In the case

of the Illinois Trust Bank v. The National Bank of Buffa-

(b)
lo,

the circuit court for the N.

D.

of New York reached

an opposite result, holding that though the defendant
had collected a draft as agent for the plaintiff, and had
kept instead of remitting

the proceeds, and in a

few

days had suspended payment, the plaintiff had no priority
over other credey'.

Several years later our Supreme

Court on almost the same statement of.facts held contra;

(c)
andfollowed the case of the People v. Bank of Rochester.
(a) Elliott v. Barnes, 31 Kan. 170; Peak v. Elliot:,
30 Kan. 156; Harrison v. Smith, 83 Mo. 210; Stollev. Coates, 3? Mo. 511; Thompson v. T , Gloucester
Bank, 8 A
P.ep. 97; Bowers v. Evans, 36 N. W. 629;
McLeod v. Evans, 28 N. W. 173; Jones v. Eilbreth,
31 N. E. 346; People v. Bank of Dansville, 39 Hun
187.
(b) Trust Bank v. Nat. Bk. of Buffalo, 15 Fed. Rep.
85w •
(c)
Pec-le v. Ban: (f Dansville, 39 Hun, 1EV';
McCo ll v. Fv>:ev, 40 H i 114.

LIMITATIONS

0N THE TFUSTEF'S RIG}IT

rTO . ... RC .... A

While we
what

ilit

.

..

..

,-asonably deduce,

we have already demonstrated,

as a

rule from

where money has

that,

been used to swell the assetts or benefit the estate

in

any way,

at

a

trust

may be enforced.

This rule seems,

first glance, to be the only logical deduction from the
authorities we have been examining, and

it has

been so

declared by a number of courts in our Western states.
Such seems not

to be the

closely reasoned cases.
the

trust

the

private

money should

or another
Scught

the

estate.

to be charged,

cestri

er creditor.

They holdit is not enough that
have been used to

It

the trust

case, according to the more

the benefit

must be shown that

fund went

into the

and still

forms a

in

some

of

form

property which is
part

of it,

or

que trust
has no greater right
s than any oth(a)
The leading ease on this point, although

(b)
not the

earliest,

i,

money had been placed

Cavin v.
in

Gleason.

the hands

Here a sum of

of one White to be

(a)
Continental Bank v. Weeffs, 69 Tex. 489;
Cavin v. Gleason, 105
N. Y. 254;
Philadelphia Bank v. Dowd, 2 L. R. Ann. 480.
(b)
105 11.
V. 254 '

in-

Instead of so doing

vested by him on bond and mortgage.
fund except $30,

he used the entire
al debts,

in

paying his -erson-

It

$30 coming into the hands of the assignee.
by the court reversing the General Term,
tiff could claim priorit:

was held

that the ploin-

only to the extent of $30, the

amount traced into the hands of the assignee.
J.,

the

and soon thereafter made an assignment,

Andrews,

in discussing the rule of law, as to tracing trust

prop rty, and its

proper limitation says:-

"If

it

app ;ars

that trust property has been wrongfully converted by the
trustee,

and constitutes,

part qf the assetts,

it

though in

a changed form,

would seem to be equitable

a
and in

accordance with equitable prihciples that the things into which the trust prop erty has been changed should,
required, be
is

impossible,

set apart for the trust,
that

or,

if'

if

separation

priority of lien should be adjudged

in faver of the trust estate for the value of the trust
property or funds

or proceeds of the trust propert,,en-

tering into and constituting a part of the assets.

This

rule simply asserts the right of the true owner to his
own Iroperty.

But it

court of equity as

in

is a general rile, as well in a
a court

of law,

that,

follow trust funds and subject them to the

in

order to

operation of

he trust, they must be

A court of equity,

identified.

in pursuing the inquiry and administering relief, is less
hampered by 'technical difficulties
and

it

be sufficient

ma-

preference
that

to entitle

in the distribution of

it app'ears that the

than a

court

of

law;

a party

to equitable

a fdnd in

insolvency,

fund or pioperty of the

insol-

vent remaining for distribution includes the proceeds of,
the trust estate, although it may be

impossible to point

out the precise thing in which the trust fund has been
invested, or the precise time when the conversion took
The

place.
ness in

the

authorities

require,

iroof before

at least

this

distinct-

preferonce can be awarded."

This case has been selerely criticized by several
courts holding the opposite theory, upon a cestui que
trust's right to apreference in such a case.

But with

due resp"ect

for the opinions of those who criticize

I think, it

is based upon law and equity.

it
trust

is

the
to a

law of New York upon the right
pref-rence

ventually mark the

it,

At all events
of a cestui que

over simple creditors,

and will

e-

line beyond which preferences will not

be allowed, in most jurisdictions.

CRITICISM OF THE RULE THAT THE RIGHT TO FOLLOW TRUST
MONEY CEASES WHiEN THE SAKE IS

MIXED WITH OTHER MONEY.

----- -___
The

long line

which hold that

1!ederal courts,
property ceases,

into money,

or

in

subject matter
a

and i ixed and. confounded in

of the

same

to follow

of' ascertainmvnt

as where the

description,

and

the several state

the right

when the means

fail,

dentification

property

of decisions

aret*t

trust

and i-

is

turned

general mass

of

based upon law

rrecedent.
In the case of the

v. First Nat.
collected a

Illinois Trust ahd Savings Bank
(a)
Bank of Buffalo,
the defendant bank had

draft as agent for the

Illinois'

kept and m~ingled the proceeds with its

bank,

and had

own funds instead

of remitting the same, and in a few days suspended payment,

and upon a suil

by the Illinois band for the fund

so held, it was decided that the plaintiffhad
ty

no priori-

over general creditors.
Wallace, J.,

trustee h-:s

saying:-

"The

cases hold that

if a

converted a trust fund into money and min-

gled the proceeds with his other moneys, so

that they

(a)
Ill. Trust and Say. Bank v. lI t r at. Bk.
falo, 15 Fed. 858.

of Buf-

wvere

indistinguishable,

the cestui que trust cannot

low his fund into the hands

of an assignee

fol-

in bankruptcy,

or of an executor of such trustee, but must occupy the
position of a general creditor of the estate."

The

court then cites as authority for its statement the case
(a)
and Story on Equity Jurispruof Whitcomb v. Jacobs,
dence.
Now upon an investigation of the adthorities cited
in Story as sustaining this proposition I find three cas-

(b)
es, and strange to say not one

of them is

for the proposition laid down in 8tory.
the cases
osition.

is first class authority for the

In authority
Indeed one of
converse prop-

This case is Coperan v. Gallant, which I here

reproduce in full:"A.

ri-de

of sale of some leases and personal

a bill

estate to B. and C.

in trust to pay A's debts;

at first

B. acted in the trust but afterwards C. took the whole
into his possession, and
rupt.

Upon which A.

ers under the

acted alone, arxi became a bank-

brought

a bill

against

C. and oth-

conmission of bankruptcy to account touch-

(a)VWhitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160; Story on Eq.
Juris. Sec. 1259;
(b) Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Yrms. 319-20; Ryall v.
Roole, 1 Atk. 172; Leigh v. Macauley, 1 Younge &
Coll. 260-5.

ilg the lersonal estate of A. so assigned in trust for
the payment

of his debts, as aforesaid.

Therefore the

assignees under the commision sued out against C.
ordered to account

were

for all t e estate of A. which the
should not be liable to

court declared per Lord Couper,
the bankruptcy of C. "

Upon the case of Whitcomb v. Jacobs and Ryall v.
(a)
Rolle aS authority for Story's proposition,Jessell, 11. R1

speaking particularly of the latter case has this to say;
"It

is

the same as Whitcomb v.

may follow the goods, but

That is no longer law."
it

7ou

Jacobs(l SalL.
cannot

Without

160).

You

follow the money.

taking up more space,

is sufficient to say, that a reading of Leigh v. Mac-

auley,

will show it to be an authority,

f one at all,

sustaining the opposite to what Story cites

it to sus-

tain.
My slight investigation leads me to the conclilsion,
that text book writers, even of the conceded ability of
the great Story, are responsible for a great many of the
mistakes

of our courts, relying, as they apparently do,

---------------- -----------------------------------(a) Whitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160;
Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 172.
Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696.
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upon the unstpported dicta of text book writers.
In Pennsylvania the first case involving the facts
I have bean considering is

decided upon the authority of
Sec.

1259.

Again in Maine
(a)
and Indiana I find the same state of affairs exist. All
Story's Equity Jurisprudence,

the later cases arising in these states follow the same
rule.

Thus it

is seen how one great text-book writer

hIs led the courts of a number of our most prominent
states astrayrfrom the course of authority and justice.

(a) Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 16;
Hopkin's Appeal, 8 Cen. Rep. 860;
McComas v. Long 85 Ind. 549;
Goodell v. Buck, 67 Me. 514

